$5.15 Billion, a Win-Win "Fire Sale"

By: blockbeats|2026/01/29 23:00:00
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Original Title: "51.5 Billion Dollars, a Win-Win 'Fire Sale'"
Original Authors: Sleepy.txt, Kaori, Dynamic Observation Beating

On January 22, 2026, Capital One announced the acquisition of Brex for $51.5 billion. This was a surprising transaction where Silicon Valley's youngest unicorn was acquired by Wall Street's oldest bankers.

Who is Brex? They are Silicon Valley's hottest corporate payment card company. Founded by two Brazilian teenage geniuses at the age of 20, Brex reached a $1 billion valuation in one year and $1 billion in ARR in 18 months. In 2021, Brex was valued at $12.3 billion, hailed as the future of corporate payments, serving over 25,000 companies, including star companies like Anthropic, Robinhood, TikTok, Coinbase, Notion, and more.

Who is Capital One? It is the sixth-largest bank in the U.S., with $470 billion in assets, $330 billion in deposits, and the third-largest credit card issuer in America. Its founder, Richard Fairbank, 74 years old this year, founded Capital One in 1988 and spent 38 years building it into a financial empire. In 2025, he had just completed the $35.3 billion acquisition of the credit card lending institution Discover, one of the largest mergers in the U.S. financial industry in recent years.

These two companies represent the speed and innovation of Silicon Valley and the capital and patience of Wall Street.

However, behind a series of data lies a paradox: Brex is still growing at a rate of 40-50%, with an ARR of $500 million and over 25,000 customers. Why would such a company choose to sell, and at a price 58% below its peak valuation?

The Brex team says it is for acceleration and scale, but accelerate what? Why now? Why Capital One?

The answer to this paradox lies in a deeper question. In the financial industry, what does time mean?

Brex Had No Choice

After the acquisition announcement, many regretted Brex's lack of choice to IPO. However, in the eyes of the Brex team, this deal came at just the right time.

Before engaging with Capital One, Brex's leadership team originally focused on continuing to raise private funding, preparing for an IPO, and operating as an independent company.

The turning point came in the fourth quarter of 2025. Brex CEO Pedro Franceschi was introduced to Fairbank, the banking giant who had led Capital One for over 38 years, who quickly dismantled Pedro's insistence with a simple logic.

.15 Billion, a Win-Win

Fairbank laid out Capital One's balance sheet, with $470 billion in assets, $330 billion in deposits, and the nation's third-largest credit card distribution network. In comparison, Brex, despite having the smoothest software interface and risk control algorithms, was always constrained by its cost of funds.

In the Fintech world, growth used to be the only currency, but by 2026, Fintech companies were facing simultaneous changes in the capital market environment, a reassessment of growth expectations, and an increasingly accelerated consolidation in the financial services industry.

According to Caplight's data, Brex is currently valued at only $3.9 billion in the secondary market. Brex CFO Dorfman mentioned a key detail in the post-mortem of the acquisition deal: "The board believed that a 13x gross profit acquisition multiple aligns with premium standards for public market-leading companies."

This statement means that if Brex chooses an IPO, in the early 2026 market environment, a Fintech company growing at 40% and not yet fully profitable would find it extremely difficult to exceed a valuation multiple of 10x in the public market. Therefore, even if it successfully goes public, Brex's market value is highly likely to fall below $5 billion and may even face long-term liquidity discounts.

On one side is an extremely uncertain path to an IPO, along with the possibility of breaking issuance price and short selling after listing; on the other side is the cash and stock combination provided by Capital One, along with immediate endorsement from a major bank.

If it's just due to valuation fluctuations, can Brex choose to optimize software and algorithms to survive the capital winter? Reality did not give Brex that option.

The Balance Sheet Is Devouring the World

For a long time, Silicon Valley believed in the A16Z mantra, "Software is eating the world."

The founder of Brex was a true believer in this creed, but the financial industry harbors a rule that is hard for a software engineer to grasp. In the currency war, user experience is only a facade; the balance sheet is the true operating system.

As a Fintech company without a banking license, Brex is essentially a shell bank. Every credit it extends relies on the funding support of partner banks at the core, and deposit interest income is also shared with the banks providing the account backing.

This was not a problem in a low-interest-rate era, as funds were abundant. However, in a high-interest-rate environment, Brex's business model began to suffocate.

We can break down Brex's revenue structure. By 2023, about 1/3 of its revenue comes from the interest margin on customer deposits, about 6% comes from SaaS subscription fees, and the rest relies on credit card transaction fees.

With interest rates at 5.5%, Brex finds itself in a squeezed situation.

On one hand, funding costs are high, and customers are no longer willing to leave millions of dollars idle in an interest-free Brex account. They demand higher returns, directly reducing Brex's margin.

On the other hand, risk weights are rising. In a high-interest-rate environment, the risk of startup failures increases exponentially. Brex's proud real-time risk control system has to become conservative, leading to significant cuts in credit limits and a sharp slowdown in transaction volume.

In the acquisition announcement, Fairbank made a subtle yet sharp comment: "We look forward to combining Brex's leading customer experience with Capital One's robust balance sheet." Translated, it means your code looks nice, but you don't have enough cheap money.

Capital One has $330 billion in low-cost deposits, meaning that lending the same $100 to a business, Capital One's profitability could be more than three times that of Brex.

Software can change the experience, but capital can buy the experience; this is the harsh reality of the 2026 fintech industry. The software system that Brex spent 9 years and $1.3 billion in funding to build is merely an integrable plug-in in the face of Capital One's strong capital.

But there is still an ultimate question: why couldn't Brex wait patiently for the next interest rate cycle like Capital One? They are not yet 30 years old, with a successful track record and abundant personal wealth, fully capable of sustaining the company. What ultimately led them to surrender?

Can't Wait at 29, Can Wait at 74

In the financial industry, time is not a friend, it's an enemy. And only capital can turn an enemy into a friend.

Henrique Dubugras and Pedro Franceschi's careers are almost an epic about speed. Entrepreneur at 16, sold a company in 3 years. Entrepreneur again at 20, became a unicorn in 2 years. They are used to measuring success in years, even in months. For them, waiting 5 to 10 years is almost the length of an entire career.

They believe in speed, rapid trial and error, rapid iteration, rapid success. This is the creed of Silicon Valley and the biological clock of 20-year-olds.

But the opponents they encountered, is Richard Fairbank.

Fairbank is 74 years old this year, founded Capital One in 1988, and took 38 years to turn it into the sixth-largest bank in the United States. He does not believe in speed, he believes in patience. In 2024, he spent $35.3 billion to acquire Discover, and the integration took over a year. In 2026, he spent $5.15 billion to acquire Brex, saying we can take 10 years to integrate.

These are two completely different time structures.

Dubugras and Franceschi, in their 20s, their time was bought with investor money. Brex raised $1.3 billion, and investors expect to see a return in 5 to 10 years, either through an IPO or acquisition.

Although this acquisition was not investor-driven, the investors' exit demand is indeed a factor that Pedro must consider when making decisions. CFO Dorfman has repeatedly emphasized providing 100% liquidity for shareholders, this is not accidental.

More importantly, the founders' own time is also limited. Pedro is 29 years old this year, he can wait 5 years, 10 years, but can he wait 20 years? Can he, like Fairbank, slowly polish a company over 38 years? When the competitor Ramp has surpassed them, the IPO window is uncertain, investors need to exit, Pedro's time is also passing.

At 74, Fairbank's time has been bought with depositors' money. Capital One has $330 billion in deposits, and while depositors could theoretically withdraw at any time, deposits are statistically a stable funding source. Fairbank can wait with this money for 5 years, for 10 years, until interest rates drop, until Fintech valuations hit rock bottom, until the best acquisition opportunity arises.

This is the asymmetry of time. Fintech's time is finite, whether for founders or investors; a bank's time is relatively infinite because deposits are a stable funding source.

Brex, with its own story, taught all Fintech entrepreneurs in Silicon Valley a lesson: no matter how fast you are, you cannot outrun the patience of capital.

The Fate of Innovators

The acquisition of Brex marks the end of an era, the era that believed Fintech could completely replace traditional banks.

Looking back over the past two years, in April 2025, American Express acquired expense management software Center. In September 2025, Goldman Sachs, after dismantling its consumer finance business, turned around and acquired an AI lending startup based in Boston. In January 2026, JPMorgan Chase completed the integration of the UK retirement Fintech platform WealthOS.

It can be said that Fintech companies are responsible for charging ahead in the 0 to 1 phase, using venture capital subsidies for market trial and error, user education, and technological innovation. And once the business model is validated, or the industry enters a downturn causing valuations to revert, traditional banks will then appear like vultures, harvesting the fruits of this innovation at a lower cost.

Brex burned through $1.3 billion in funding, amassed 25,000 of the highest-quality startup clients, and honed a world-class financial engineering team. And now, Capital One only needs to pay $5.15 billion, a significant portion of which is in stock, to take over all of this.

From this perspective, Fintech entrepreneurs are not disrupting banks, they are working for banks. This is a new form of risk outsourcing, where traditional banks no longer need to conduct high-risk R&D internally, they just need to wait.

Brex's exit has shifted all the spotlight onto its competitor, Ramp.

As the only current super-unicorn on the track, Ramp still looks strong. Its ARR is still growing, and its balance sheet seems more robust. But its time is also ticking.

Ramp was founded in 2019 and, following the VC investment cycle, it has now entered its seventh year, which requires accountability. Late-stage investors entered in 2021-2022 at a valuation of over $30 billion, and their return expectations will far exceed Brex's.

If the IPO window in 2026 remains open only to a very few profitable giants, will Ramp face a similar dilemma?

History does not merely repeat itself, but always rhymes. Brex's story tells us that in the ancient industry of finance, there is no such thing as a purely software company. When the external environment changes suddenly, Fintech's time disadvantage is exposed, forcing them to choose between acquisition and long-term struggle. Pedro chose the former, not as surrender, but as a sober choice.

Yet this very sobriety is Fintech's destiny.

Just don't forget, the former Brex once claimed to disrupt American Express, even setting the Wi-Fi password in an office to "BuyAmex."

Original Article Link

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China's Central Bank and Eight Other Departments' Latest Regulatory Focus: Key Attention to RWA Tokenized Asset Risk


Foreword: Today, the People's Bank of China's website published the "Notice of the People's Bank of China, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration for Market Regulation, China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, China Securities Regulatory Commission, State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Further Preventing and Dealing with Risks Related to Virtual Currency and Others (Yinfa [2026] No. 42)", the latest regulatory requirements from the eight departments including the central bank, which are basically consistent with the regulatory requirements of recent years. The main focus of the regulation is on speculative activities such as virtual currency trading, exchanges, ICOs, overseas platform services, and this time, regulatory oversight of RWA has been added, explicitly prohibiting RWA tokenization, stablecoins (especially those pegged to the RMB). The following is the full text:


To the people's governments of all provinces, autonomous regions, and municipalities directly under the Central Government, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps:


  Recently, there have been speculative activities related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets (RWA) tokenization, disrupting the economic and financial order and jeopardizing the property security of the people. In order to further prevent and address the risks related to virtual currency and Real-World Assets tokenization, effectively safeguard national security and social stability, in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the People's Bank of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Commercial Banks," "Securities Law of the People's Republic of China," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Securities Investment Funds," "Law of the People's Republic of China on Futures and Derivatives," "Cybersecurity Law of the People's Republic of China," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Administration of Renminbi," "Regulations on Prevention and Disposal of Illegal Fundraising," "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Foreign Exchange Administration," "Telecommunications Regulations of the People's Republic of China," and other provisions, after reaching consensus with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and with the approval of the State Council, the relevant matters are notified as follows:


  I. Clarify the essential attributes of virtual currency, Real-World Assets tokenization, and related business activities


  (I) Virtual currency does not possess the legal status equivalent to fiat currency. Virtual currencies such as Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, etc., have the main characteristics of being issued by non-monetary authorities, using encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technology, existing in digital form, etc. They do not have legal tender status, should not and cannot be circulated and used as currency in the market.


  The business activities related to virtual currency are classified as illegal financial activities. The exchange of fiat currency and virtual currency within the territory, exchange of virtual currencies, acting as a central counterparty in buying and selling virtual currencies, providing information intermediary and pricing services for virtual currency transactions, token issuance financing, and trading of virtual currency-related financial products, etc., fall under illegal financial activities, such as suspected illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public issuance of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, etc., are strictly prohibited across the board and resolutely banned in accordance with the law. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to provide virtual currency-related services to domestic entities in any form.


  A stablecoin pegged to a fiat currency indirectly fulfills some functions of the fiat currency in circulation. Without the consent of relevant authorities in accordance with the law and regulations, any domestic or foreign entity or individual is not allowed to issue a RMB-pegged stablecoin overseas.


(II)Tokenization of Real-World Assets refers to the use of encryption technology and distributed ledger or similar technologies to transform ownership rights, income rights, etc., of assets into tokens (tokens) or other interests or bond certificates with token (token) characteristics, and carry out issuance and trading activities.


  Engaging in the tokenization of real-world assets domestically, as well as providing related intermediary, information technology services, etc., which are suspected of illegal issuance of token vouchers, unauthorized public offering of securities, illegal operation of securities and futures business, illegal fundraising, and other illegal financial activities, shall be prohibited; except for relevant business activities carried out with the approval of the competent authorities in accordance with the law and regulations and relying on specific financial infrastructures. Overseas entities and individuals are not allowed to illegally provide services related to the tokenization of real-world assets to domestic entities in any form.


  II. Sound Work Mechanism


  (III) Inter-agency Coordination. The People's Bank of China, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of virtual currency-related illegal financial activities.


  The China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, the Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other departments, will improve the work mechanism, strengthen coordination with the Cyberspace Administration of China, the Supreme People's Court, and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, coordinate efforts, and overall guide regions to carry out risk prevention and disposal of illegal financial activities related to the tokenization of real-world assets.


  (IV) Strengthening Local Implementation. The people's governments at the provincial level are overall responsible for the prevention and disposal of risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets in their respective administrative regions. The specific leading department is the local financial regulatory department, with participation from branches and dispatched institutions of the State Council's financial regulatory department, telecommunications regulators, public security, market supervision, and other departments, in coordination with cyberspace departments, courts, and procuratorates, to improve the normalization of the work mechanism, effectively connect with the relevant work mechanisms of central departments, form a cooperative and coordinated working pattern between central and local governments, effectively prevent and properly handle risks related to virtual currencies and the tokenization of real-world assets, and maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  III. Strengthened Risk Monitoring, Prevention, and Disposal


  (5) Enhanced Risk Monitoring. The People's Bank of China, China Securities Regulatory Commission, National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Foreign Exchange, Cyberspace Administration of China, and other departments continue to improve monitoring techniques and system support, enhance cross-departmental data analysis and sharing, establish sound information sharing and cross-validation mechanisms, promptly grasp the risk situation of activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization. Local governments at all levels give full play to the role of local monitoring and early warning mechanisms. Local financial regulatory authorities, together with branches and agencies of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, as well as departments of cyberspace and public security, ensure effective connection between online monitoring, offline investigation, and fund tracking, efficiently and accurately identify activities related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly share risk information, improve early warning information dissemination, verification, and rapid response mechanisms.


  (6) Strengthened Oversight of Financial Institutions, Intermediaries, and Technology Service Providers. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing account opening, fund transfer, and clearing services for virtual currency-related business activities, issuing and selling financial products related to virtual currency, including virtual currency and related financial products in the scope of collateral, conducting insurance business related to virtual currency, or including virtual currency in the scope of insurance liability. Financial institutions (including non-bank payment institutions) are prohibited from providing custody, clearing, and settlement services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related business and related financial products. Relevant intermediary institutions and information technology service providers are prohibited from providing intermediary, technical, or other services for unauthorized real-world asset tokenization-related businesses and related financial products.


  (7) Enhanced Management of Internet Information Content and Access. Internet enterprises are prohibited from providing online business venues, commercial displays, marketing, advertising, or paid traffic diversion services for virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities. Upon discovering clues of illegal activities, they should promptly report to relevant departments and provide technical support and assistance for related investigations and inquiries. Based on the clues transferred by the financial regulatory authorities, the cyberspace administration, telecommunications authorities, and public security departments should promptly close and deal with websites, mobile applications (including mini-programs), and public accounts engaged in virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization-related business activities in accordance with the law.


  (8) Strengthened Entity Registration and Advertisement Management. Market supervision departments strengthen entity registration and management, and enterprise and individual business registrations must not contain terms such as "virtual currency," "virtual asset," "cryptocurrency," "crypto asset," "stablecoin," "real-world asset tokenization," or "RWA" in their names or business scopes. Market supervision departments, together with financial regulatory authorities, legally enhance the supervision of advertisements related to virtual currency and real-world asset tokenization, promptly investigating and handling relevant illegal advertisements.


  (IX) Continued Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities. The National Development and Reform Commission, together with relevant departments, strictly controls virtual currency mining activities, continuously promotes the rectification of virtual currency mining activities. The people's governments of various provinces take overall responsibility for the rectification of "mining" within their respective administrative regions. In accordance with the requirements of the National Development and Reform Commission and other departments in the "Notice on the Rectification of Virtual Currency Mining Activities" (NDRC Energy-saving Building [2021] No. 1283) and the provisions of the "Guidance Catalog for Industrial Structure Adjustment (2024 Edition)," a comprehensive review, investigation, and closure of existing virtual currency mining projects are conducted, new mining projects are strictly prohibited, and mining machine production enterprises are strictly prohibited from providing mining machine sales and other services within the country.


  (X) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal Financial Activities. Upon discovering clues to illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets, local financial regulatory authorities, branches of the State Council's financial regulatory authorities, and other relevant departments promptly investigate, determine, and properly handle the issues in accordance with the law, and seriously hold the relevant entities and individuals legally responsible. Those suspected of crimes are transferred to the judicial authorities for processing according to the law.


 (XI) Severe Crackdown on Related Illegal and Criminal Activities. The Ministry of Public Security, the People's Bank of China, the State Administration for Market Regulation, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, as well as judicial and procuratorial organs, in accordance with their respective responsibilities, rigorously crack down on illegal and criminal activities related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, such as fraud, money laundering, illegal business operations, pyramid schemes, illegal fundraising, and other illegal and criminal activities carried out under the guise of virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, etc.


  (XII) Strengthen Industry Self-discipline. Relevant industry associations should enhance membership management and policy advocacy, based on their own responsibilities, advocate and urge member units to resist illegal financial activities related to virtual currency and the tokenization of real-world assets. Member units that violate regulatory policies and industry self-discipline rules are to be disciplined in accordance with relevant self-regulatory management regulations. By leveraging various industry infrastructure, conduct risk monitoring related to virtual currency, the tokenization of real-world assets, and promptly transfer issue clues to relevant departments.


  IV. Strict Supervision of Domestic Entities Engaging in Overseas Business Activities


(XIII) Without the approval of relevant departments in accordance with the law and regulations, domestic entities and foreign entities controlled by them may not issue virtual currency overseas.


  (XIV) Domestic entities engaging directly or indirectly in overseas external debt-based tokenization of real-world assets, or conducting asset securitization activities abroad based on domestic ownership rights, income rights, etc. (hereinafter referred to as domestic equity), should be strictly regulated in accordance with the principles of "same business, same risk, same rules." The National Development and Reform Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange, and other relevant departments regulate it according to their respective responsibilities. For other forms of overseas real-world asset tokenization activities based on domestic equity by domestic entities, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, together with relevant departments, supervise according to their division of responsibilities. Without the consent and filing of relevant departments, no unit or individual may engage in the above-mentioned business.


  (15) Overseas subsidiaries and branches of domestic financial institutions providing Real World Asset Tokenization-related services overseas shall do so legally and prudently. They shall have professional personnel and systems in place to effectively mitigate business risks, strictly implement customer onboarding, suitability management, anti-money laundering requirements, and incorporate them into the domestic financial institutions' compliance and risk management system. Intermediaries and information technology service providers offering Real World Asset Tokenization services abroad based on domestic equity or conducting Real World Asset Tokenization business in the form of overseas debt for domestic entities directly or indirectly venturing abroad must strictly comply with relevant laws and regulations. They should establish and improve relevant compliance and internal control systems in accordance with relevant normative requirements, strengthen business and risk control, and report the business developments to the relevant regulatory authorities for approval or filing.


  V. Strengthen Organizational Implementation


  (16) Strengthen organizational leadership and overall coordination. All departments and regions should attach great importance to the prevention of risks related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization, strengthen organizational leadership, clarify work responsibilities, form a long-term effective working mechanism with centralized coordination, local implementation, and shared responsibilities, maintain high pressure, dynamically monitor risks, effectively prevent and mitigate risks in an orderly and efficient manner, legally protect the property security of the people, and make every effort to maintain economic and financial order and social stability.


  (17) Widely carry out publicity and education. All departments, regions, and industry associations should make full use of various media and other communication channels to disseminate information through legal and policy interpretation, analysis of typical cases, and education on investment risks, etc. They should promote the illegality and harm of virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses and their manifestations, fully alert to potential risks and hidden dangers, and enhance public awareness and identification capabilities for risk prevention.


  VI. Legal Responsibility


  (18) Engaging in illegal financial activities related to virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization in violation of this notice, as well as providing services for virtual currencies and Real World Asset Tokenization-related businesses, shall be punished in accordance with relevant regulations. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law. For domestic entities and individuals who knowingly or should have known that overseas entities illegally provided virtual currency or Real World Asset Tokenization-related services to domestic entities and still assisted them, relevant responsibilities shall be pursued according to the law. If it constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be pursued according to the law.


  (19) If any unit or individual invests in virtual currencies, Real World Asset Tokens, and related financial products against public order and good customs, the relevant civil legal actions shall be invalid, and any resulting losses shall be borne by them. If there are suspicions of disrupting financial order and jeopardizing financial security, the relevant departments shall deal with them according to the law.


  This notice shall enter into force upon the date of its issuance. The People's Bank of China and ten other departments' "Notice on Further Preventing and Dealing with the Risks of Virtual Currency Trading Speculation" (Yinfa [2021] No. 237) is hereby repealed.


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